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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(j) (2001) (cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court). The
Supreme Court's jurisdiction was based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (2001)
(appeals from judgments of Utah state district courts over which Court of Appeals lacks
original jurisdiction).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellee Sue Ann Sheville ("Ms. Sheville"), as the guardian of Edwin L.
Sheville, a protected person, agrees that this Court may properly review (1) whether the
trial court committed plain error in awarding Ms. Sheville her costs; (2) whether the trial
court correctly determined that Appellant Sandra Sheville Holman's ("the Appellant's")
actions in this case were without merit; (3) whether the trial court correctly determined
that the Appellant's actions in this case were brought in bad faith; (4) whether the trial
court correctly determined that the Appellant and Mr. David Grindstaff are jointly and
severally liable for payment of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) whether
the trial court correctly determined that the reasonable and proper amount of the
attorneys' fees and costs awarded to Ms. Sheville is $81,820.41.
Ms. Sheville disagrees, however, with the Appellant's assertion that Rule 54(d) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure precludes the trial court's award of costs was properly
preserved for consideration on appeal. This issue was not preserved in the trial court and
is therefore waived, as discussed in further detail below. See Franklin Financial v. New

Empire Development. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983) (refusing to address issue
not preserved before the trial court).
Ms. Sheville therefore offers the following statement of issues in lieu of that
contained on pages 1-3 of Appellant's Opening Brief (hereinafter "Br. of Appellant").
This formulation of the issues more accurately captures the arguments presented to the
trial court and the basis for the court's decision below.
ISSUE #1
Was the trial court correct when it determined that the Appellant's actions in this
case were without merit? Ms. Sheville agrees that this is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
ISSUE#2
Was the trial court correct when it determined that the Appellant's actions in this
case were brought in bad faith? Ms. Sheville agrees that this is a question if fact
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203-04
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
ISSUE #3
Did the trial court commit plain error in awarding Ms. Sheville her costs? This
question is governed by the standards set forth in State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, 4 P.3d 778
(to establish plain error, appellant must prove an error exists that should have been
obvious to the trial court that resulted in harm to the appellant).

ISSUE #4
Was the trial court correct when it determined that the Appellant and Mr.
Grindstaff are jointly and severally liable for payment of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees
and costs? Ms. Sheville agrees that this is a question of law reviewed for correctness.
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998).
ISSUE #5
Was the trial court correct when it determined that the reasonable and proper
amount of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees and costs incurred as a result of the actions of
the Appellant and Mr. Grindstaff totaled $81,820.41? Ms. Sheville agrees that this is a
question of fact reviewed for abuse of discretion. Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah
1998).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS ON APPEAL
This appeal turns exclusively upon the interpretation of two statutes authorizing
the trial court to award attorneys fees and/or costs. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) (2001)
provides that "[I]n civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." Likewise, section 75-1-310 of
the Uniform Probate Code provides that "[w]hen not otherwise prescribed in this code,
the court, or the Supreme Court on appeal from the court, may, in its discretion, order
costs to be paid by any party to the proceedings or out of the assets of the estate as justice
may require."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant's Statement of the Case is replete with argumentative and factually
unsupported assertions devoid of any citation to the record. Accordingly, Ms. Sheville
submits the following Statement of the Case in lieu of that contained in the Brief of the
Appellant.
On October 19, 2000, Ms. Sheville filed a Petition for Emergency Appointment of
Guardianship of Incapacitated Person with the trial court. (R. at 14). On December 19,
2000, after being twice appointed as temporary guardian, the trial court appointed Ms.
Sheville as Edwin L. Sheville's ("Edwin's") permanent guardian. (R. at 220-21). On
January 30, 2001, Ms. Sheville filed a Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (R. at 227).
On June 5, 2001, the trial court issued a minute entry granting Ms. Sheville's Motion,
holding that the Appellant's actions in this case were without merit, that she lacked an
honest belief in the propriety of her actions and undertook activities, including perjury,
which improperly hindered and delayed Ms. Sheville's physical custody of Edwin and
her appointment as his guardian. (R. at 338-40). This minute entry was incorporated in
the trial court's Order dated July 2, 2001, ordering the Appellant and Mr. Grindstaff1
jointly and severally liable for payment of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees and costs. (R. at
342-43). On August 23, 2001, Ms. Sheville filed a Supplemental Motion for Attorneys'
Fees and Costs. (R. at 348). The trial court granted the Motion on October 24, 2001 and

1

Although Mr. Grindstaff filed a Notice of Appeal on July 31, 2001, (R. at 346-47), he
passed away on January 11, 2002. No briefs have been submitted on his behalf.

determined that the reasonable and proper amount of the attorneys' fees and costs
awarded to Ms. Sheville totaled $81,820.41. (R. at 407-09).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Ms. Sheville is the daughter and the appointed Guardian of her father,

Edwin Sheville (R. at 467).
2.

On December 9, 1999, Ms. Sheville took Edwin to his physician, Dr.

Joseph DeVito, M.D.

Dr. DeVito concluded that Edwin was suffering from senile

dementia, most likely of the Alzheimer's type. (R. at 35-39). Dr. DeVito referred Edwin
to a neurologist, Dr. Andreas N. Neophytides, M.D., who made a diagnosis of
microvascular dementia. (R. at 40-43).
3.

Based on his declining health, Edwin signed a durable power of attorney on

December 23, 1999, appointing Ms. Sheville as his attorney in fact. (R. at 5-7). Prior to
that time, Ms. Sheville had assisted Edwin with his financial affairs, but had never
sought, nor been appointed, as guardian or conservator over Edwin. (R. at 468).
4.

On June 2, 2000, at Christiana Care, Dr. Dee Dresser, M.D. evaluated

Edwin, but did not make any definitive determination that he was competent. Rather,
Ms. Sheville indicated to a nurse that Edwin had been mildly confused in the past, but
that, up to that point, he had not appeared incompetent as a result of his confusion. (R. at
468).
5.

Soon thereafter, Ms. Sheville took Edwin to New York City to live with

her. During the time Edwin lived with Ms. Sheville, Ms. Sheville was able to further
witness the point to which Edwin's mental capacity had deteriorated. (R. at 469).

6.

During the time he was living with Ms. Sheville, Edwin indicated that he

desired his own space. (R. at 469.). Therefore, on June 8, 2000, Edwin checked himself
into an assisted living center in New York called Prospect Park Residence. (R. at 469).
7.

On October 2, 2000, Ms. Sheville went to the assisted care facility where

Edwin was living to take him to two doctors' appointments, but she was informed by the
facility that Edwin had missed two meals and could not be located. After a search of the
care facility, the police were contacted. (R. at 469).
8.

Ms. Sheville knew nothing of Edwin's whereabouts until a few days later

when she received a phone call from a realtor who was handling the sale of Edwin's
Delaware farm, informing Ms. Sheville that she had been contacted by a Salt Lake
realtor. (R. at 469-70).
9.

Upon discovering that Edwin was in Utah, Ms. Sheville flew to Salt Lake

to locate him, to take him clothing and medicine, and to check on his well-being. (R. at
470).
10.

On October 6, 2000, Ms. Sheville arrived in Salt Lake and immediately

went to the Appellant's home to look for Edwin. (R. at 470). Initially, no one was home.
When Ms. Sheville returned later, the Appellant was home but received Ms. Sheville in a
hostile manner.

The Appellant said she did not know anything about Edwin's

disappearance and did not know his whereabouts. (R. at 470). Thereafter, the Appellant
never notified Ms. Sheville of Edwin's location nor allowed Ms. Sheville to visit him.
(R. at 470).

11.

On October 10, 2000, Ms. Sheville hired private detective Richard C.

Romano to assist her in locating her father. (R. at 470). On October 18, 2000, Mr.
Romano observed Edwin with the Appellant. (R. at 10).
12.

Because Ms. Sheville was being denied access to her father, she filed a

Petition for Emergency Appointment of Guardian of Incapacitated Person with the trial
court on October 19, 2000, which precipitated all of the proceedings in this case. (R. at 14). Ms. Sheville was appointed temporary guardian and a hearing on the temporary
guardianship was scheduled for October 25, 2000. (R. at 11-12).
13.

On October 23, 2000, an ex parte protective order against Ms. Sheville was

obtained, purportedly at Edwin's request. (R. at 91-94). This protective order was later
dismissed by the trial court. (R. at 178).
14.

On October 25, 2000 during the hearing on Ms. Sheville's Motion for

Emergency Appointment of Guardian, the Appellant and Mr. Grindstaff, who represented
that he was Edwin's attorney, both appeared and claimed that Edwin was competent and
that he contested the guardianship proceedings. (R. at 473).
15.

Based upon these representations, the temporary guardianship was

terminated and the parties were referred to mediation. (R. at 22). The trial court also
appointed Margy Campbell ("Ms. Campbell"), a licensed social worker and gerontologist
as a court visitor and Dr. Frederick Gottlieb, a gerontologist with the Salt Lake Senior
Center, as physician, and ordered that Edwin be examined by them. (R. at 22).

16.

The court ordered mediation was held on November 3, 2000. The hearing

began at approximately 2:00 P.M., and during a caucus at approximately 5:30 P.M., the
Appellant disappeared with Edwin, thus ending the mediation proceedings. (R. at 473).
17.

On October 31, 2000, Ms. Campbell conducted an initial interview with

Edwin in her office and scheduled a home visit for November 2, 2000. (R. at 44-49).
18.

During her consultation visit with Edwin on October 31, 2000, Edwin

indicated that he had liked the New York assisted care facility, his room, the
socialization, and the food. (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. # 2, at p. 24).
19.

After her October 31, 2000, evaluation, Ms. Campbell concluded that

Edwin was in need of a guardian and conservator, and a protected, stable environment.
(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2, at p. 17.). Ms. Campbell further testified that it was not
difficult after a period of time to determine that Edwin was incapacitated, and he was
clearly unable to track conversations and was suffering from severe dementia. (R. at 413;
Hearing Trans. #2, at p. 25-26.).
20.

The Appellant contacted Ms. Campbell on the evening of November 1,

2000, and told Ms. Campbell that Edwin would be unavailable for the home visit on
November 2, 2000 because he had gone out of town with the Appellant's husband for a
vacation. (R. at 475). The Appellant also indicated that she too would be unavailable
because she was joining Edwin and her husband. Ms. Campbell did not schedule another

2

For convenience of the Court, Ms. Sheville will refer to the two hearing transcripts in
the Record as Hearing Trans. #1 for the November 21, 2000 hearing, and Hearing Trans.
#2 for the November 21, 2000 and December 12, 2000 hearing, as was designated by the
Appellant.

home visit at that time because the Appellant did not know when she and Edwin would
be returning from the vacation. (R. at 475-477).
21.

Based on her interviews and visits with Edwin and his presenting difficulty

with content focus, short term memory loss and an inability to track basic conversation,
Ms. Campbell stated that any lay person spending time with Edwin would identify his
profound incapacity and memory disability. (R. at 476).
22.

Edwin was scheduled to be examined per court order by Dr. Frederick

Gottlieb on November 10, 2000 at 9:00 a.m. On November 9, 2000 at 4:30 p.m., the
Appellant called and cancelled the appointment. (R. at 32).
23.

On November 13, 2000, Ms. Sheville filed a Motion for Order Setting

Deadline for Examination. (R. at 30).
24.

On November 15, 2000, during the hearing on Ms. Sheville's Motion for

Order Setting Deadline for Examination, the trial court entered an order requiring the
parties to complete the examinations within 15 days or as soon thereafter as could be
scheduled. (R. at 50). During the course of this hearing, Mr. Grindstaff disclosed that on
November 13, 2000, Edwin had engaged in a marital ceremony to a woman named Betty
Quigley. (R. at 473).
25.

The Appellant introduced Edwin to Ms. Quigley (R. at 413; Hearing Trans.

#2; at p.69) and acted as a witness to the marriage ceremony. (R. at 315).
26.

After Dr. Frederick Gottlieb finally examined Edwin, he concluded that

Edwin was incapacitated and had been subjected to undue influence. Dr. Gottlieb also

suspected elder abuse based upon the way in which Edwin was brought to Utah and his
subsequent marriage, of which he had no recollection. (R. at 186-192).
27.

On November 17, 2000, Ms. Sheville filed a second Petition for Emergency

Temporary Appointment of Guardian of Incapacitated Person.

(R. at 56-61). Ms.

Sheville was again appointed temporary guardian and a hearing on this Petition was
scheduled for November 21, 2000. (R. at 109). A writ of assistance was authorized to
obtain custody of Edwin. (R. at 106-08). However, the private detectives, constables and
Sheriffs Department were unable to locate him. (R. at 473-74).
28.

On November 21, 2000, at the hearing on Ms. Sheville's Petition for

Temporary Guardianship, Edwin did not appear and both Mr. Grindstaff and Appellant
denied any knowledge of his whereabouts. (R. at 414; Hearing Trans. #1, at p. 3, 10).
29.

During this hearing, the trial court made the following facts:
[It] appears someone has hidden Mr. Sheville or a person
with dementia is out there wandering around with a purported
spouse who may or may not have a better ability to take care
of herself than he has to take care of himself. [The]
protective order proceeding was obviously a sham. Whoever
participated in that was perpetrating a fraud on this court.
As I indicated earlier, Ms. Holman has taken affirmative
action to circumvent and avoid complying with Judge
Peuler's orders. And neither Ms. Holman nor [her daughter]
appears by their testimony, to have any concern at all about
the welfare of their father and grandfather. And I don't
believe their testimony. I'm so finding.

(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2, at pp. 78-79) (emphasis added).
30.

The trial court also stated as follows [With regard to counsel's objections to

portions of Ms. Sheville's testimony]: "Nothing significant except that it appears that you

have a client, Mr. Olsen, who's hiding a father from other children." (R. at 413; Hearing
Trans. #2 at p. 32).
31.

Regarding the Appellant's interference with the guardianship proceedings,

the trial court also stated as follows:
[Y]our client has taken affirmative actions to frustrate the
orders of Judge Peuler. That's the problem we have. She
ended the temporary guardianship contingent upon the court
visitor finishing her examination and having a medical
appointment. Your client has frustrated both those things
from happening.
I'm not seeing any improper conduct on the part of anybody
other than your client and perhaps Mr. Grindstaff is not
representing his client's best interests.
(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at p. 54.).
32.

During this hearing, the trial court also had the following dialogue:
The Court: [T]he only person whose conduct is in question,
as far as endangering him or his assets at this point, is Ms.
Holman.
Mr. Grindstaff: I don't understand the asset part, because I
have never seen her do anything with his assets.
The Court: Well, there has to be some reason for picking
him up in New York, hauling him out here with no notice and
then hiding him from every effort to have this investigation
that Judge Peuler ordered finished.

(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at pp. 56-57).
33.

The trial court affirmed Ms. Sheville's appointment as temporary guardian

and ordered the parties to turn Edwin's custody over to Ms. Sheville. (R. at 220-21).

34.

Later that same day, the Appellant located Edwin and turned him over to

Ms. Sheville at Garden Terrace, where he remained until Ms. Sheville was appointed
permanent guardian. (R. at 314).
35.

On November 29, 2000, the Appellant filed an Objection to Petition for

Appointment of Guardian of an Incapacitated Person, wherein she cites her equal
standing, her ability to care for Edwin and his expressed interest in staying in Utah as her
criteria for her objection. (R. at 179-80).
36.

On November 30, 2000, attorneys for Betty Quigley, Edwin's purported

wife, demanded $15,000.00 for damages suffered due to her marriage to Edwin. The
demand was based in part upon a prenuptial agreement prepared by Mr. Grindstaff prior
to the marriage. (R. at 236-38).
37.

On December 12, 2000, during a hearing on Ms. Sheville's Petition for

Guardian of Incapacitated Person, the trial court made the following statement:
The Court: Mr. Olsen, I'm still considering whether or not
to report to the DA and ask him to prosecute Ms. Holman for
perjury and endangering Mr. Sheville. There is no way that I
would consider her as a potential guardian. Given what I've
heard this morning and the hearing before.
(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at p. 106.).
38.

Also during this December 12, 2000 hearing, Kent Alderman, counsel for

Ms. Sheville, had the following dialogue with Edwin:
Mr. Alderman: Do you know where you are today?
Edwin: I'm in a Supreme Court in the state of ~ must be
Delaware.

Mr. Alderman: Do you know what today is?
Edwin: I would say it's Monday. I don't know other than
that. Monday.

Mr. Alderman: Is there anyone else in the courtroom you
recognize?
Edwin: The. . . I think the lady that just stood [referring to
Holman], I recognize as someone in my past presence of this
case.. . But I don't know who she is, whether she's a relative
or not.

Mr. Alderman: Ed, do you know what a protective order is?
Edwin: I've heard about it, but I don't know what one really
is....
(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2, at pp. 83-86.)
39.

On December 19, 2000, the trial court found Edwin to be incapacitated and

appointed Ms. Sheville as his permanent guardian. (R. at 220-223).
40.

On January 30, 2001, Ms. Sheville filed a motion for attorneys' fees and

costs. (R. at 224). In a minute entry dated June 5, 2001, the court made the following
findings and conclusions:
1.
The Court finds that Ms. Holman's actions in this case
were without merit. Holman knew or should have known that
Mr. Sheville was incapacitated and Holman's objections to
the guardianship proceedings and pursuit of a fraudulent
protective order were frivolous.
2.
The Court finds that Ms. Holman lacked an honest
belief in the propriety of her actions and undertook activities,

including perjury, which improperly hindered and delayed
Ms. Sheville's appointment as guardian.
3.
The Court finds that attorney David Grindstaff failed
to ascertain relevant facts and failed to investigate Mr.
Sheville's competency.
Consequently, because Mr.
Grindstaff clearly acted contrary to his client's best interests,
he, along with Ms. Holman, shall be jointly and severally
liable for payment of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees and costs.
4.
The Court further finds that the attorney fees in the
amount of $61,780.66 are reasonable and proper. The
amount of $35,364.92 compensates Sheville for he expenses
she incurred in defending against Holman "s bad faith claim,
and the amount of $26,415.74 compensates attorney Kent B.
Alderman. The Court concludes that the basis for these
amounts is properly documented and delineated in the parties'
respective affidavits.
(R. at 338-339).
41.

On July 5, 2001, the trial court signed an Order granting Ms. Sheville's

Motion. (R. at 342-43).
42.

On August 23, 2001, Ms. Sheville filed a Supplemental Motion for

Attorneys' Fees and Costs. (R. at 348). By Order dated October 23, 2001, the trial court
granted Ms. Sheville's Motion, awarding Ms. Sheville her attorneys' fees and costs
totaling $81,820.14. (R. at 407-09).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court was correct in awarding Ms. Sheville, as guardian of Edwin, her
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in regaining custody of Edwin, vacating a fraudulent
marriage, returning Edwin to his home, and establishing the guardianship. The trial court
correctly held that the Appellant's actions in this case were without merit and brought in
bad faith, justifying the award of attorneys' fees pursuant to section 78-27-56 of the Utah

Code. Further, the trial court's award of costs is authorized pursuant to section 75-1-310
of the Uniform Probate Code. Whether or not Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure applies in this case is not an issue that should be addressed by this Court as the
Appellant failed to preserve this issue before the trial court. This issue is therefore
waived.
It is undeniable that, from the initial stages of the guardianship proceedings and
continuing thereafter, Edwin was incapacitated and susceptible to undue influence. His
incapacity was evident to anyone who spent any time talking with him. The Appellant
knew, or should have known that Edwin was incapacitated and her objections to the
guardianship proceedings were accordingly without merit.
The record is replete with further examples of the Appellant's bad faith. For
example, the Appellant terminated the court ordered mediation without cause, cancelled
the scheduled examination by the court appointed physician, prevented the completion of
the examination by the court appointed visitor, participated in the fraudulent marriage of
Edwin, and participated in the filing of a fraudulent protective order purportedly filed by
Edwin against Ms. Sheville. Indeed, the trial court recognized that this protective order
was an attempt by the Appellant to delay and hinder the guardianship proceedings and
that it was fraud on the court. Thus, it cannot reasonably by disputed that the Appellant
acted in bad faith, hindering and delaying these guardianship proceedings.
Because of the Appellant's unconscionable conduct that has delayed and hindered
the proceedings before the trial court, Ms. Sheville was properly awarded her attorneys'
fees resulting from the delay and unnecessarily complicated proceedings. The trial court

correctly determined that Ms. Sheville was likewise entitled to her costs, finding that the
reasonable and proper amount of these fees and costs totaled $81,820.41, an amount that
was properly documented and supported before the trial court. The trial court's order
awarding attorneys' fees and costs against the Appellant should therefore be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED MS, SHEVILLE HER
ATTORNEYS' FEES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN, § 78-27-56.
The trial court correctly ordered that the Appellant actions throughout the

guardianship proceedings were without merit and in bad faith, justifying the award of
attorneys' fees.3 Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code provides that "[i]n civil actions,
where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement, the court may award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to
the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." The plain
language of this statute therefore contains two distinct elements to support a fee award.
First, the action or defense must be without merit. Second, the action or defense must be
lacking in good faith. Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). The trial court
correctly concluded that Ms. Sheville met both requirements of section 78-27-56 and its
Order should therefore be affirmed.

Ms. Sheville concedes that, pursuant to Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah
1998), costs are not recoverable pursuant to section 78-27-56. As explained in further
detail below, however, the trial court's award of costs was proper pursuant to the
Uniform Probate Code.

A.

The Trial Court Correctly Held That The Appellant's Actions Were Without
Merit.

Pursuant to section 78-27-56, a claim is without merit if it is "'frivolous' or 'of
little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact.'" Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d
149, 151 (Utah 1983). Subsequent Utah Supreme Court decisions have held claims to be
meritless even when the claims have had some basis in law or fact.

Valcarce v.

Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998); Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah
1987).

In Valcarce, the court concluded "that the trial court properly found the

[defendant's] actions to be meritless. Although the [defendant's] claims may have had
some basis in law and they ostensibly provided evidence of their factual claims, the trial
court found the facts to be contrary to that evidence."

Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315

(emphasis added). Likewise, in Topik, the court sustained an award of attorneys' fees
because it found a defendant had falsely testified regarding his defense. Thus, either false
testimony or testimony that is not supported by the weight of the relevant evidence is
considered meritless, as was correctly determined by the trial court.
It is unmistakable that, prior to, during and throughout the guardianship
proceedings, Edwin was incapacitated and susceptible to undue influence. The Appellant
knew or should have known that Edwin was severely incapacitated and her objections to
the guardianship proceedings were therefore without merit. Before the trial court, and
again in her Opening Brief, the Appellant offers several reasons why she objected to Ms.
Sheville's appointment as guardian, arguing that each reason had merit. However, none

of these reasons form a sufficient basis in law or fact to give her objection any merit
whatsoever.
First, the Appellant argues that she has "an equal right to act as the Guardian for
Edwin L. Sheville in the event a Guardian is required." (Br. of Appellant at 19). This
reasoning misses the mark. Section 75-5-311 of the Uniform Probate Code established
the priority for appointment of a guardian. According to this provision, order of priority
is as follows: first, a statutory nomination by the incapacitated person prior to the
incapacity; second, a non-statutory nomination; third, the spouse of the incapacitated
person; and fourth, an adult child of the incapacitated person. See Utah Code Ann. § 755-311 (2001). The Power of Attorney Edwin granted to Ms. Sheville effectively placed
Ms. Sheville in the second category of priority for guardianship as well as in the fourth
category. Accordingly, Ms. Sheville, not the Appellant, had priority for guardianship of
Edwin. An equal right for guardianship only exists if other priorities do no apply.
Likewise, although the Appellant may have possessed a threshold right, it did not
authorize the Appellant to misuse that right. Whether or nor she had standing to bring
her objection does not legitimize her otherwise meritless objection. Standing is only a
bare right if her underlying claim remains unmeritorious.
Furthermore, merely because Edwin had not been officially

adjudicated

incompetent, the Appellant did not have the right to ignore the great weight of the
evidence indicating incapacity. The Appellant argues that she relied on Edwin's medical
records from June 1, 2000 which stated that Mr. Sheville had only "mild confusion" due
to an intra cranial hemorrhage, but had "been judged to be competent." (R. at 319). This

statement, however, is taken entirely out of context and refers to part of the assessment of
Edwin's competence. The statement appears in the section of the report titled "History of
the Present Illness" and notes that Edwin's medical history was provided by Ms. Sheville.
(R. at 319). Ms. Sheville had commented to the nurses that up until the time of his most
recent episodes, Edwin had experienced problems but still appeared, in her judgment, to
be competent (R. at 468). Nowhere in the report is there any detailed mental competency
examination of the type used for determining capacity.
Indeed, Edwin's medical records from New York, which were filed with the trial
court early in the proceedings, contain information revealing Edwin's struggles with
senile dementia of the Alzheimer's type. (R. at 35-43) Further, both Dr. Gottlieb, the
court appointed physician, and Ms. Campbell, the court visitor, judged Edwin to be
incapacitated. (R. at 475-76; 186-92). In fact, Ms. Campbell opined that "any lay person
spending time with Edwin would identify his profound incapacity and memory
disability." (R. at 476).
Most convincingly, during the December 12, 2000 hearing before the trial court,
Edwin was unaware of his very surroundings, he incorrectly identified the day, the
month, his place of residence, and even the state in which he was located. Nor did Edwin
know who Mr. Grindstaff was or his role in the proceedings. (R. at 413; Hearing Trans.
#2 at pp. 83-86). Moreover, Edwin could not properly describe why he was in court that
day and failed to recognize the Appellant except as someone from his past and then only
after the Appellant stood up. (Id.). If the Appellant did not know with a surety that Mr.
Sheville was lacking mental capacity, she should have at least constructively been aware

of that fact. In either case, when contrasted against the great weight of the evidence, her
purported belief does not make her objection any more meritorious.
The Appellant also claims that she had a factual basis for asserting in her objection
to Ms. Sheville's petition that the Appellant was capable of caring for Edwin, had cared
for him in the past, and that he desired to remain in the State of Utah and close to the
Appellant. (Br. of Appellant at 20). A review of the record, however, demonstrates
otherwise. In fact, as set forth above, during the December 12, 2000 hearing, Edwin
himself contradicted this assertion. Edwin identified the Appellant as a person "from his
past" whom he did not recognize. (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at pp. 83-86). The
Appellant was obviously not a person with whom he had spent a significant amount of
quality time as she would suggest. Further, at no time did Edwin ever testify during the
proceedings that he disliked or distrusted Ms. Sheville. Moreover, the Appellant offers
no evidence from Edwin, Ms. Campbell, or any physician in either New York or Utah to
substantiate these allegations. Rather, she presents only her hearsay account of Edwin's
purported conversations. As such, there is no credible evidence to support this claim.
The trial court also held that the Appellant's pursuit of the frivolous protective
order purportedly filed by Edwin against Ms. Sheville was fraudulent. (R. at 338). The
Appellant asserts that the protective order was entirely Edwin's idea. (Br. of Appellant at
22). Edwin's own testimony, however, demonstrates otherwise. When asked in court if
he knew what a protective order was, he could not give a cogent answer:
Q.

[Edwin], do you know what a protective order is?

A.

I've heard about it, but I don't know what one really is.

(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at p. 86). In contrast, the Appellant's name and that of her
husband curiously appear on the protective order as protected parties.

(R. at 91).

Although the Appellant may not have technically moved for the protective order, it is
apparent that she nonetheless participated in bringing it. The Appellant's purported
explanations for her actions in this case are simply not supported by the weight of the
relevant evidence in this case. The trial court's holding that her actions were without
merit should therefore be affirmed.
B.

The Trial Court Correctly Held that the Appellant's Actions in this Case
Were Brought in Bad Faith.

In its June 5, 200t Minute Entry, the trial court correctly held that the Appellant
"lacked an honest belief in the propriety of her actions and undertook activities, including
perjury, which improperly hindered and delayed Ms. Sheville's appointment as
guardian." (R. at 338). This entry was incorporated in the trial court's July 2, 2001
Order. (R. at 343). The record reflects an abundance of evidence supporting this finding,
and the trial court's Order should therefore be affirmed.
To prove that a party acted in bad faith, a court must find that one of the following
factors existed: (1) the party lacked an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in
question; (2) the party intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) the
party intended to act or acted with the knowledge that the activities in question would
hinder, delay, or defraud others. Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983).
Further, material misrepresentations and a disregard for truth evidence a lack of honest
belief by a party in the propriety of its actions. See Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204

(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Under this analysis, the Appellant's lack of candor with the trial
court is sufficient to uphold its finding of lack of honest belief on her part.
In the instant case, the trial court expressed serious concerns about the truthfulness
of the Appellant's own testimony, going so far as to consider reporting her to the district
attorney for perjury. (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2. at p. 106). Further, during the course
of the proceedings, the Appellant claimed and represented to the trial court that Edwin
was competent, kept Edwin's whereabouts hidden from Ms. Sheville (R. at 470),
cancelled appointments with Ms. Campbell and Dr. Gottlieb (R. at 475-77; R. at 32),
arranged for Edwin to participate in a questionable marriage (R. at 315; 413; Hearing
Trans.#2 at p. 69), and likely participated in filing a fraudulent protective order. The trial
court recognized the Appellant's lack of candor and bad faith numerous times throughout
the proceedings. For example, during the November 21, 2000 hearing, the trial court
made the following findings:
[It] appears that someone has hidden Mr. Sheville or a person
with dementia is out there wandering around with a purported
spouse who may or may not have a better ability to take care
of herself than he has to take care of himself. [The]
protective order proceeding was obviously a sham. Whoever
participated in that was perpetrating a fraud on this court. As
I indicated earlier, Ms. Holman has taken affirmative action
to circumvent and avoid complying with Judge Peuler's
orders. And neither Ms. Holman nor [her daughter] appears
by their testimony, to have any concern at all about the
welfare of their father and grandfather. And I don't believe
their testimony. I'm so finding.
(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at pp. 78-80). During this same hearing, the trial court,
responding to counsel's objections to portions of Ms. Sheville's testimony, stated,

"Nothing significant except that it appears that you have a client, Mr. Olson, who's
hiding a father from other children." (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at p. 32). The trial
court concluded by finding that the Appellant "has taken affirmative actions to frustrate
the orders of Judge Peuler." (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at p. 54), and that "the only
person whose conduct is in question, as far as endangering [Edwin] or his assets at this
point, is Ms. Holman." (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at p. 56). Finally, and perhaps
most tellingly, during the December 12, 2000 hearing, the trial court stated that he was
"still considering whether or not to report to the DA and ask him to prosecute Ms.
Holman for perjury and endangering Mr. Sheville. There is no way that I would consider
her as a potential guardian." (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2. at p. 106).
These findings by the trial court alone are sufficient to affirm its finding of bad
faith. However, the record reflects additional evidence demonstrating the Appellant's
obstructionist and bad faith behavior for which the Appellant vainly offers several
explanations.

(See Br. of Appellant at 24-32).

Her explanations, however, fail to

overcome the trial court's finding of bad faith. First, the Appellant claims that she had
nothing to do with Edwin's departure from New York and travel to Utah. As support for
this allegation, the Appellant filed an affidavit, wherein she states that she sent Edwin
$200.00 to see an attorney in Delaware regarding real estate. (R. at 310-17). She further
states that she was unsure, but Edwin may have used that money to come to Salt Lake
City. (Id.). Finally, she states that she did not know Edwin was coming to Utah and she
did not particularly want him to come to Salt Lake. (Id.).

The Appellant's own live

testimony, however, contradicts her statements in her affidavit. For example, during the

November 21, 2000 hearing, the Appellant testified that she sent Edwin the $200.00 in
cash for him to come to Utah:
Q.

Did you pay for his transportation? Help?

A.

I did.

Q.

Who did you pay?

A.

I just sent the money to him.

Q.

Did he—did he contact you to do that?

A.

Yes. He said that he wanted to meet me halfway.

Q.

How much cash?

A.

I sent him $200.

Q.
And then he made the arrangements, is that what you
are telling me?
A.

Yes.

(R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at pp.62-63). Contrasting the Appellant's testimony at this
hearing with that provided in her affidavit, it is clear that the Appellant intended Edwin to
come to Utah, that she wanted him to come, and that she sent him money for
transportation to come and not for an attorney as she contended in her affidavit. Further,
according to Edwin's medical reports, Edwin lacked the medical capacity to form the
intent to leave New York and travel to Utah, much less the capacity to actually carry out
such a plan.
The record additionally reflects ample evidence that the Appellant intentionally
delayed visits with the court visitor and physician. Ms. Campbell, the court appointed

visitor, conducted an interview with Edwin in her office on October 31, 2000 and
scheduled a home visit for November 2, 2000. (R. at 475-76). The Appellant contacted
Ms. Campbell on the evening of November 1, 2000 and told Ms. Campbell that Edwin
would be unavailable for the home visit on November 2 because he had gone out of town
with the Appellant's husband for a vacation. (Id.). The Appellant also indicated that she
too would be unavailable because she was joining her husband and Edwin.

Ms.

Campbell did not schedule another home visit at that time because the Appellant did not
know when she and Edwin would be returning from the vacation. (Id.). However, in her
affidavit, the Appellant again presents contradicting testimony, explaining that her
cancellation of Edwin's appointment was necessary for installation of safety equipment
in the home of her daughter. (R. at 310-17). No mention was made to Ms. Campbell
about the installation of this safety equipment at the time of the cancellation.
Likewise, the Appellant explains that she cancelled Edwin's appointment with Dr.
Gottlieb, the court appointed physician, because Edwin was too sick to meet with him the
next morning. (Br. of Appellant at 29). This argument is somewhat illogical because
Edwin was able to see Dr. Fuller the next day. Presumably, Edwin could have received
the same attention for his ailments from Dr. Gottlieb while complying with the court
ordered examination.
The Appellant's attempts to delay and hinder Ms. Sheville's appointment as
guardian is additionally demonstrated by her actions at the court ordered mediation.
During a caucus , the Appellant took Edwin and disappeared, failing to return to the
mediation, and failing to notify opposing counsel or the mediator of her decision to take

Edwin and leave. (R. at 472-74).

The Appellant's self-serving assertions that she

believed the mediation was over and that Edwin was ill, viewed in light of the
Appellant's obstructionist behavior throughout the proceedings is highly suspect.
Finally, despite the undeniable fact that Edwin was incapacitated and suffering
from dementia, the Appellant participated in the fraudulent marriage of Edwin and Betty
Quigley. The Appellant contends that she did not exercise any undue influence and was
not involved in any way in the marriage. However, the Appellant admits that she in fact
introduced Edwin to Ms. Quigley. (R. at 413; Hearing Trans. #2 at p. 69). Furthermore,
the Appellant attended and acted as a witness at the wedding.

(R. at 315).

The

Appellant's vehement denials any involvement in Edwin's wedding is entirely
implausible given Edwin's obvious incapacity and the fact that Edwin was living in the
Appellant's home and supposedly receiving her care. Most importantly, Dr. Gottlieb
reported that during his evaluation, Edwin had no recollection of the marriage or the
identity of his new wife. (R. at 186-192). In light of this irrefutable evidence, it strains
credulity to suggest that the Appellant was in no way involved in the marriage.
The record is filled with example after example of the Appellant's bad faith. Any
one of these examples is sufficient to sustain the trial court's finding of bad faith. The
trial court, particularly observant of the Appellant's tactics during the guardianship
proceedings, correctly determined that her actions amounted to bad faith.
court's Order should therefore be affirmed.

The trial

II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS IS AUTHORIZED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 75-1-310 OF THE UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE,
The trial court properly awarded Ms. Sheville her costs pursuant to section 75-1-

310 of the Uniform Probate Code. This section provides that "[w]hen not otherwise
prescribed in this code, the court, or the Supreme Court on appeal from the court, may, in
its discretion, order costs to be paid by any party to the proceedings or out of the assets of
the estate as justice may require." Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-310 (2001). This statute
grants specific statutory authority for a court to award a party its costs.
The Appellant complains that the trial court erred in awarding Ms. Sheville her
costs because of the alleged failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 54(d) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, because the Appellant failed to preserve this
issue at the trial court, it is not properly before this Court for consideration. Moreover,
this argument ignores the fact that the trial court did not have to rely on Rule 54(d) for an
award of costs, but could instead utilize section 75-1-310 of the Uniform Probate Code as
the basis of the award.
A.

The Appellant Did Not Preserve Issues Involving Rule 54(d) Before The Trial
Court

In her brief, the Appellant argues that the plain language of Rule 54(d) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure bars Ms. Sheville's right to recover the costs and attorneys' fees
awarded by the trial court.

This argument, however, is irrelevant in light of the

undeniable fact that the Appellant failed to preserve this issue before the trial court. As
stated by this Court, "[I]ssues not raised in the trial court in a timely fashion are deemed

waived, precluding the appellate court from considering their merits on appeal."
LeBaron & Associates v. Rebel Enterprises. 823 P.2d 479, 482-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
The Utah Supreme Court has mandated that for a question to be considered on appeal,
"the record must clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we cannot merely assume that it was properly
raised." Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah
1983) (emphasis added);. Further, "[t]he burden is on the parties to make certain that the
record they compile will adequately preserve their arguments for review in the event of
an appeal." Id.
For example, in James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), this Court
considered whether the plaintiff had sufficiently raised the claim of equitable mortgage at
trial to preserve the issue on appeal. The plaintiff had obliquely raised the issue in his
complaint and the plaintiffs counsel made two brief references to the theory during the
bench trial. This Court held that these references were insufficient to have raised the
issue below, holding:
[The plaintiff] supplied no legal authority dealing with
equitable mortgages nor any showing of the relevance of the
facts to an equitable mortgage theory during the course of the
trial. The trial court made no ruling as to the existence of an
equitable mortgage and [the plaintiff] made no objection to
this omission. . . . For an issue to be sufficiently raised, even
if indirectly, it must at least be raised to a level of
consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it.
Id. at 802. Likewise, in Franklin Financial 659 P.2d al 1045, the appellant argued that
the trial court incorrectly awarded summary judgment to the appellee because, among

other alleged errors, the contract at issue had been amended, creating a new and separate
agreement. The Supreme Court, however, refused to consider this issue, holding that
"[a]though it is conceivable, but not likely, that the argument was raised orally in the
hearing on the motion for summary judgment, there is nothing whatsoever in the record
to support that possibility, and there is no such contention in appellants' briefs." Id.
(emphasis added).
Franklin Financial is strikingly similar to the instant case. Here, the Appellant
acknowledges that she made no mention of Rule 54(d) in any of the briefs or filings
before the trial court.

The Appellant, like the appellants in Franklin Financial

nonetheless argues that this issue was properly preserved because the Appellant's counsel
raised this argument during oral argument. (Br. of Appellant at 13). Tellingly, however,
the Appellant fails to cite to any portion of the record supportive of this self-serving
assertion. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Franklin Financial 659 P.2d
at 1045, it is the parties' burden to ensure that the record on appeal adequately preserves
the issues appealed. As the record in this case is utterly devoid of any mention of Rule
54(d) or its application to this case, that issue is not properly before this Court for
consideration.
Moreover, even assuming that this issue was mentioned during oral argument, the
judge was presented with no legal authority in which to make an informed and reasoned
ruling on this issue. Oblique references to this argument during the hearing are not
enough to raise the issue "to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge can

consider it." James, 746 P.2d at 802. As there is no record of this issue ever being raised
below, the issue of Rule 54(d) is therefore waived.
B.

The Trial Court Did Not Commit Plain Error In Awarding Ms. Sheville Her
Costs.

To establish the existence of "plain error" and obtain relief from an alleged legal
error that was not properly preserved at the trial court, the appellant must show, "(i) an
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome." State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, ^ 1, 4 P.3d 778. The Appellant cannot meet
these criteria because even if Rule 54(d) precludes the award of costs in this case, the
Uniform Probate Code specifically authorizes such an award, precluding the finding of
any error or prejudice suffered by the Appellant. A party in a proceeding governed by
the Uniform Probate Code is therefore not precluded from obtaining costs despite any
alleged failure to adhere to the requirements of Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The court in a guardianship proceeding retains jurisdiction over the guardian
and ward until the guardian is discharged. Further, the guardian has an ongoing duty to
collect and protect the assets of the ward, including any claims tbeward may have against
any person who has caused harm to the ward or his estate.
In addition, as the Probate Code provides statutory authority for award of costs in
this case, the Appellant's reliance on Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980) and
its progeny is misplaced. Under Frampton, costs under Rule 54(d) means those fees
"which are required to be paid to the court and to witnesses, and which the statutes

authorize to be included in the judgment." Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774. Such a narrow
definition makes sense in normal civil litigation. However, guardianship cases differ
significantly from general civil litigation, making the analysis in Frampton inapplicable.
In guardianship cases, unlike civil litigation, the primary party involved is incapable of
defending himself. As explained by section 75-1-310 of the Utah Probate Code, the court
can, in its discretion, award costs. In the instant case, it was appropriate for the trial court
to order that the Appellant pay Ms. Sheville's costs. It would be entirely inappropriate to
charge Edwin's estate for the costs incurred by his agent under her power of attorney, his
guardian and daughter, Ms. Sheville, in locating, recovering and returning Edwin to his
home in New York. Indeed, as the court in Frampton recognized, "the trial court can
exercise reasonable discretion in regard to the allowance of costs; and that it has a duty to
guard against any excesses or abuses in the taxing thereof." Frampton v. Wilson, 605
P.2d 771, 773-74 (Utah 1980).
In the instant case, the costs awarded by the trial court are not excessive but rather
are wholly contemplated by the distinctive nature of the guardianship proceedings, as
explained above.

In fact, the costs incurred by Ms. Sheville would not have been

incurred but for the actions of the Appellant in removing Edwin from New York,
bringing him to Utah and hiding him, and participating in Edwin's marriage to a friend of
the Appellant, all in a vain attempt to gain control of his assets.

The trial court

committed no error in awarding costs to Ms. Sheville and its order should accordingly be
affirmed.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THE APPELLANT AND MR.
GRINDSTAFF JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR MS.
SHEVILLE'S ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS.
The trial court correctly held the Appellant and Mr. Grindstaff were jointly and

severally liable for payment of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees and costs. The Appellant
complains that Ms. Sheville's affidavits are insufficient because they do not break down
into separate categories the damages resulting from the Appellant's behavior as opposed
to Mr. Grindstaff s behavior. (Br. of Appellant at 32-37). In support of her argument,
the Appellant cites to Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998), which requires
apportionment between parties and costs in attorney fee disputes. However, the analysis
in Foote is limited in application to situations where the party seeking an award of fees
was successful on some, but not all claims. Indeed, Foote involved several opposing
parties and several unsuccessful claims. Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d at 55. Furthermore,
even where a party is only successful on some claims, that party may still be
compensated for all claims that are "inextricably tied together" or "which are so closely
related," that they require proof of the same facts. Brown v. Richards, 978 P.2d 470, 475
(Utah Ct. App. 1999); see also First General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 486 (Utah
Ct.App. 1996).
The Appellant contends that Ms. Sheville is not entitled to attorneys' fees incurred
in filing the original Petition for Emergency Appointment as Guardian or the filing of the
Petition for Permanent Appointment as Guardian because Ms. Sheville would have
incurred those fees regardless of the Appellant's conduct. (Br. of Appellant at 35). The
Appellant further contends that she is not responsible for fees incurred by Ms. Sheville in

defending the Protective Order or the Annulment of Ms. Sheville's marriage because she
was not involved in either. (Br. of Appellant at 35-36). These assertions are erroneous.
Ms. Sheville was forced to file her Petitions for Guardianship because of the Appellant's
conduct and participation in bringing Edwin to Salt Lake City and hiding him from Ms.
Sheville. Furthermore, as explained above, the evidence demonstrates that the Appellant
was indeed involved in the sham protective order as well as Edwin's marriage.
The proceedings before the trial court centered on determining Edwin's capacity
and if found incapacitated, whom should be appointed as his guardian and conservator.
Ms. Sheville was twice appointed temporary Guardian and eventually permanent
Guardian of Edwin. Further, Ms. Sheville successfully opposed the Appellant's own
Petition for Guardianship and a fraudulent protective order. Clearly, in the proceedings
at issue, Ms. Sheville prevailed on all of her claims.

Thus, the requirements for

apportioning under Foote do not apply in this case.
Similarly, as a basis for their involvement in the guardianship proceedings, both
the Appellant and Mr. Grindstaff contended that Edwin was competent and both the
Appellant and Mr. Grindstaff contended that Ms. Sheville should not be appointed
guardian. Consequently, Ms. Sheville was able to use the same facts and evidence to
prevail against both parties simultaneously.

As a result, the requirements for

apportionment do not apply to this case and there are no deficiencies in the
documentation that prevented the trial court from awarding Ms. Sheville's costs and fees
against the Appellant.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE REASONABLE
AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS INCURRED BY MS.
SHEVILLE TOTALLED $81,820.41.
The trial court was correct in determining that the reasonable amount of attorneys'

fees and costs incurred by Ms. Sheville totaled $81,820.41.

In determining the

reasonableness of requested attorneys' fees and costs, Utah courts, "have simply insisted
that the trial court gear its assessment to accomplish the purpose of attorneys' fees, i.e., to
reasonably compensate counsel for their time reasonably expended in pursuing the
underlying case in accordance with the authorizing contract or statute." Foote v. Clark,
962 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1998). Likewise, "[b]ecause the trial court 'is in a better position
than an appellate court to gauge the quality and efficiency of the representation and the
complexity of the litigation,' we have endowed the trial courts with discretion to assess
the reasonableness of the fees requested under a contract or statute."

Id. See also

Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998) (holding trial court has discretion
to determine reasonable attorneys fees because "it is in a better position than an appellate
court to gauge the quality and efficiency of the representation and the complexity of the
litigation."). In addition, "if reasonable fees are recoverable by contract or statute and the
trial court considers all pertinent factors and determines in the exercise of its sound
discretion that a specific sum is a reasonable fee, it is a mistake of law to award less than
that amount." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988).
Ms. Sheville met the documentary requirements for such an award supporting her
motion for costs and fees by submitting to the trial court detailed affidavits of attorney
fees and costs, including invoices and calculations of the amounts sought by her motion.

(R. at 227-71; 376-90). The Affidavits of Ms. Sheville and her counsel Mr. Alderman
properly document the necessity for the costs and the reasonableness of the fees incurred
throughout the proceedings before the trial court.
The Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
include findings of fact in its Order documenting its evaluation of the reasonableness of
the requested fees and costs. (Br. of Appellant at 37-38). This argument is factually and
legally incorrect. Contrary to the Appellant's suggestions, in the Minute Entry dated
June 5, 2001, the trial court did indeed make findings of fact supporting its award of
attorneys' fees and costs. (R. at 338)4. The fact that the trial court's July 2, 2001 Order
does not contain specific "Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law" does not mean that
the trial court did not make any such findings. Indeed, the Minute Entry was
4

In this Minute Entry, the trial court made the following findings:
1.

The Court finds that Ms. Holman's actions in this case were without merit.
Holman knew or should have known that Mr. Sheville was incapacitated
and Holman's objections to the guardianship proceedings and pursuit of a
fraudulent protective order were frivolous.

2.

The Court finds that Ms. Holman lacked an honest belief in the propriety of
her actions and undertook activities, including perjury, which improperly
hindered and delayed Ms. Sheville's appointment as guardian.

3.

The Court finds that attorney David Grindstaff failed to ascertain relevant
facts and failed to investigate Mr. Sheville's competency. Consequently,
because Mr. Grindstaff clearly acted contrary to his client's best interests,
he, along with Ms. Holman, shall be jointly and severally liable for
payment of Ms. Sheville's attorneys' fees and costs.

4.

The Court further finds that the attorney fees in the amount of $61,780.66
are reasonable and proper. The amount of $35,364.92 compensates
Sheville for he expenses she incurred in defending against Holman's bad
faith claim, and the amount of $26,415.74 compensates attorney Kent B.
Alderman. The Court concludes that the basis for these amounts is
properly documented and delineated in the parties' respective affidavits.

incorporated into the Order. In any event, even if the trial court failed to make findings,
its award could nonetheless be affirmed because, "the Utah Supreme Court has noted that
section 78-27-56 does not require written findings on bad faith unless the court fails to
award attorney fees or limits its award of attorney fees." Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202,
204 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added); see also Canyon Country Store v.
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 421-22 (Utah 1989) (holding section 28-27-56 does not "require
written findings on the bad faith issue."). As clarified by the Utah Supreme Court in
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 n.l (Utah 1998), "[h]owever helpful such
findings may be, the failure to enter them, alone, does not warrant reversal."
Accordingly:
In cases in which factual issues are presented to and must be
resolved by the trial court but no findings . . . appear in the
record, we 'assume that the trier of facts found them in
accordance with its decision, and we affirm the decision if
from the evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to
support it.'
Id at 316. (quoting State v Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991)). The record
demonstrates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
requested attorneys' fees and costs were reasonable. Accordingly, the trial court's Order
should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court was correct in awarding Ms. Sheville her attorneys' fees and costs
incurred in locating Edwin, defending a purported protective order, establishing
temporary and permanent guardianship over Edwin, and annulling his marriage to the

Appellant's friend. The award of Ms. Sheville's costs was authorized pursuant to section
75-1-310 of the Uniform Probate Code and the award of fees was authorized pursuant to
section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code. The trial court correctly determined that the
Appellant actions throughout the guardianship proceedings were without merit and in bad
faith. As Ms. Sheville prevailed on all of her claims against both the Appellant and Mr.
Grindstaff, apportionment was not required and the trial court correctly ordered both the
Appellant and Mr. Grindstaff jointly and severally liable for reasonable attorneys fees
and costs totaling $81,820.40. The Order of the trial court should accordingly be
affirmed in its entirety.
DATED this A% day of September, 2002.
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